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30  October,  1984 I  would  first of all like to say  how  grateful and  ap-
preciative  I  am  to  you  Mr.  Chairman  and  to the International 
Minerals  and  Chemical  Corporation for  the warmth  of your 
hospitality,  the  excellence of  your  conference organisation 
and  for giving me  this opportunity to  share  a  few  thoughts 
with  such  a  distinguished gathering on  a  topic not only 
of vital importance  to  8  million European  farmers  and  their 
families  and  to  270 million European  consumers  but  a  topic 
also with considerable implications  for  World  Food. 
I  refer,  of  course,  to  the  subject of  European agri-
culture,  the  outlook for its future  and  to its place in 
international trade.  This is the  subject on  which  I  would 
like to concentrate this morning. 
Anyone  from  Europe  who  goes  about  and  speaks  in the 
United States quickly realises that mentioning  the  European 
Community's  farm policy does  not always  lead to  a  burst of 
wild  and  enthusiastic cheering  from  the  back  of  the hall. 
But  I  have  never  allowed this to put me  off,  so let me  start 
by first describing where  our  farm  policy has  got to. 
As  a  number  of  you  will know,  the European  Community 
has  operated its own  farm policy - the  Common  Agricultural 
Policy or  CAP  - for  the last 20  years  or so,  and  I  imagine 
that  some  of  you will also realise that its objectives are 
set out  in Article  39  of  the Treaty of  Rome,  our  founding 
Constitution,and  can  be  summarised  as  follows  : 
./  ... 
1. - to increase productivity through  technical 
progress  ; 
- to give  the  farmer  a  fair standard of  living 
- to assure  the  supply of sufficient food  at 
reasonable prices,  and 
- to stabilise markets. 
Goals  which are  not very different  - I  would  have  thought  -
from  farm policies in the United States  and  elsewhere. 
Very broadly,  the objectives of the Treaty have  been 
achieved  by  fixing  common  prices for  the major part of our 
farm production.  Some,  but  by  no  means  all,of these prices 
are at higher  levels  than  those  in other countries.  But, 
assurance  of  supply  like any  insurance policy costs money. 
And  the  European  consumer is prepared to pay this small 
premium  for  food  security.  For many,  security has  as  much 
to  do  with  food  as it has  with missiles.  But  here,  let me 
emphasise  that the  CAP  should not  be  looked at in  a  purely 
economic  context but against  a  social and political background 
as well  since we  believe that the  well-being of agriculture 
is essential to the  fabric  of rural life. 
Let  us  now  look briefly at what the effects of 
achieving  these objectives have  been  - both inside  and 
outside the  Community. 
We  are  frequently  accused  by  our critics of  spending 
limitless  sums  of money  to encourage  our  farmers  to pro-
duce  enormous  surpluses which are  then off-loaded onto 
world  markets  by  means  of unfair subsidies.  But let us 
examine  the  facts. 
.;  ... 
2. First.  As  a  result of the  support we  give  our  farmers, 
our wheat production,  for  example,  increased by  29%  over 
the last decade  - slightly more  than  the world  average  of 
27%.  The  increase in the u.s.  was  73%.  This 
latter increase is  2~ times  the world  average.  I  say this 
in no  accusatory  sense,  but in an  attempt  to set the  record 
straight.  Furthermore,  the  increase in  Community production 
was  achieved  through  higher yields on  an  acreage  that 
has  remained virtually unchanged  for  the  last ten  to fifteen 
years. 
Second  - the extent of our expenditure.  The  total 
Community  budget  for  1983  and  which  represented less than 
1%  of  Community  GNP  amounted  to  some  $23  billion.  Not  our 
deficit Mr.  Chairman  but our total budget.  Of  this,$15  bil-
lion- an all time record- was  spent on  agriculture.  This 
compared with almost  $30  billion in  the  US  - PIK  included-
for  about  one quarter the  number  of farmers. 
And,  unlike all national governments  that I  know  of, 
there is a  rigid limit strictly enforced  by  our  Member  States 
as  to  the  amount  we  can  spend,since our Constitution forbids 
us  to  run  a  deficit.  We  do  not  have  the doubtful  advantage 
of  being able to print money  as  though  we  were  playing Mono-
poly. 
As  to  the  impact of  the  CAP  and  our much  criticised 
exports  refunds  on world markets,  just two  points.  Since 
I  get the distinct impression that there is  a  feeling 
. I ... 
3. 4. 
among  less well  informed groups  than this one  that agri-
cultural subsidies  are  an  invention of cunning  Europeans 
and  the work  of  the devil. 
First.  Yes,  it is a  fact  - and  a  very visible one  -
that we  give export refunds.  These  compensate  for  the dif-
ference  between  the  world  price and  our internal price  -
when  this is higher  - and  are part of the cost of maintaining 
farmers  incomes. 
But,  international trading rules  formalised  in the  GATT 
(the  General  Agreement  on  Tariffs and  Trade)  to which both 
the  EC,  the US,Japan and  90  or  so  other nations  are  signata-
ries,  specifically permit the  use  of  export refunds or 
subsidies,  provided  they are not used  to gain more  than 
and  equitable  share of  the market nor  to undercut  the 
' 
going price.  We  maintain,  and  trade  statistics support 
our  view,  that we  have  kept to  these rules.  But what,  our 
American  friends  ask,  is equitable  ? 
We  explain that this is rather like drafting  a  definition of 
an  elephant.  Difficult,  but if one  were  to enter this room, 
I  think most  of us  could guess  the kind of animal  involved. 
Second,  other exporters of  farm  products  use  export 
subsidies.  The  us,  for  example,  in addition to supporting 
its agriculture at home  pretty generously over recent years, 
also deploys  a  panoply of export aids  - GSM-102,  PL-480, 
Blended Credits  and  plain unvarnished  subsidies.  I  offer these observations not  to  score  easy points,  but  simply 
to register the  fact that agricultural subsidies are  a 
feature  of life in the modern  world,  and  perhaps  we  are 
all - or most  of  us  - sinners  in the eyes of  the Lord. 
But  these  explanations  should not be  taken  to  imply 
that everything is fine  as  regards  European agriculture 
and  that we  have  no  problems  whatsoever  in the  Community. 
Those  of  you  who  follow developments  in Europe, 
if only through  your  newspapers,  will be  well  aware 
of  the  serious challenges  we  currently face.  On  the  agri-
culture front,  we,  and  indeed other major producers,  are 
basically faced  with  the  same  problem  :  that of  producing 
larger quantities  than markets  can  absorb which,  of  course, 
is far  from  being  the  same  as  saying  that there is too  much 
food  in the world. 
Whilst  I  strongly believe that the  CAP  is one  of  the 
major  achievements  of  the  European  Community,  it must  -
like any  other institution or policy, if it is to survive, 
and  survive it will  - adapt itself to changing  conditions. 
In  the  Community,  the  CAP  has  to  a  large extent been 
the victim of its own  success.  The  technical advances  and 
productivity gains  sought  in Article  39  have  meant  that 
output has  risen more  rapidly  than  consumption.  We  have 
s. 
. I ... achieved  self-sufficiency in  a  number  of products  and 
have  reduced  our  dependence  on  imports.  In other cases, 
the  Community  has  become  a  net exporter.  But,  a  respon-
sible one,  supporting  the principle of price stabilisation 
agreements  and,  in spite of  strong internal pressures  to 
do  otherwise,  building up  our  stocks  to unprecedented 
levels.  What  is more,  we  are not net exporters of  as 
many  products  as  is sometimes  alleged.  It was  claimed 
only the other day at a  hearing in Washington  that the 
Community  had  become  a  net exporter of  feed  grains  - as 
though  this in itself  was  a  cardinal sin.  If,  however, 
grain  substitutes are  included in the calculation,  as  they 
surely must be,  the  Community  remains  a  net importer. 
Furthermore,  in spite of  achieving security of  supply 
in  a  number  of  important  farm products  - another  of  the 
Treaty's aims -the EC  remains  by  far  the world's  largest 
importer of  agricultural and  food  products purchasing, 
as  we  do,  about  ~ of all world  imports  - and  in hard  cash. 
In fact,  we  have  seen our overall agricultural trade de-
ficit grow  by more  than  60%  from  $14  bio in  1973  to  $23 
bio in 1982. 
Productivity increases have  also  led to  a  serious 
imbalance  of  supply  and  demand  in Europe  - with milk  as 
the most glaring example.  Increases  in the volume  of 
total agricultural production have  averaged  between  1  ~ 
and  2%  over recent years whilst  consumption has  only 
risen by  about  ~  %. 
. I .. . 
6. At  the  same  time,  we  are  running  very  low  on  cash  -
in spite of  the  fact that our  farm  expenditure represents 
only about  ~% of  our  GDP.  From  1974  to  1979,  expenditure 
on  supporting  agricultural markets  grew at  23%  per year  -
almost twice  the rate of  growth  in our  revenue.  For  the 
next  two  or three years  - 1980  to  1982  - expenditure re-
mained  fairly stable,  largely because prices remained 
relatively high  on  world markets.  But since  then expen-
diture has  increased sharply and  rose  by  about  30%  in 1983. 
As  I  said earlier - our  Community constitution for-
bids  us  to  run  a  budget deficit.  So,  for  the first time 
we  are up  against our  financial  limits. 
This chilling fact  coupled with that of  production 
outpacing  consumption is the  background  against which  the 
Commission  proposed  and  the  Council  of Ministers  - that 
is to  say national Ministers  from  our ten Member  States 
in a  rare act of political courage,  adopted  on  31  March 
an essential and very  tough battery of measures  for  the 
rationalisation of  our agriculture. 
Time  does  not allow me  to describe  in any detail 
the  full  range  of measures which will hit European  farmers 
and their families  and which will demand  substantial sacri-
fices  from  them.  But recent demonstrations  by  European 
farmers,in  England  and France,  for  example,  leave little 
doubt  that they are being  squeezed. 
. I ... 
7. 8. 
Briefly the decisions reached  in March  can  be 
summarised  under  six main  points 
1.  confirmation of  the principle of  guarantee  thresholds,  and 
their extension to other products 
2.  strict control of milk  production  by means  of quotas  ; 
3.  a  return to  the unity of  the market,  through  the  dis-
mantling  of monetary  compensatory  amounts  ; 
4.  tough policy for prices  ; 
5.  streamlining  of  aids  and  premiums  for various products  ; 
6.  observance of  Community  preference. 
Let me  flesh out four  of  those  six main  elements  -
guarantee  thresholds,  the action on milk,  prices and 
Community  preference  : 
(a)  Guarantee  Thresholds: 
We  in the  Commission  have  been insistently warning  the 
Council  of Ministers for  the last 4  years  - and  I  quote 
from  what  we  said in 1980  - that 
'in the present state of agricultural technology,  it is 
neither economically  sound  nor  financially feasible  to 
guarantee price or aid  levels  for  unlimited quantities'. 
We  argued  that the  Community  had  passed the  level of 
self-sufficiency for  many  major  products,  and  while pro-
duction was  continuing to rise,  the  increase in  consumption 
was  practically nil.  In  these  circumstances, we  said that 
. I ... there  should be  'producer coresponsibility above  a  certain 
level of production  - that is,  a  first stage in which 
Community  responsibility would  be  total,  and  a  second 
in which it would  be  shared  between  the  Community  and 
producers'. 
In  the  following  years,  this idea was  refined  by  the 
development  of  the  'guarantee threshold'  concept.  This 
term indicates  the  predetermined level of  farm  production 
beyond  which producers  have  to  share  financial responsi-
bility.  In  1982,  the  Council  introduced  thresholds  for 
several products  (milk,  cereals,  colza  and  processed 
tomatoes)  in addition to  those where  analogous  measures 
already existed  (sugar  and  cotton).  The  level of  these 
thresholds naturally differed according to the products, 
as did  the  steps to be  taken in the event of their being 
exceeded but,  in general,  they consisted of  a  cut,  direct 
or indirect,  in the price or aid for  the  product in 
question.  In its March  1984  decisions  the Council not 
only extended  thresholds  to  further products  (sunflower 
seed,  durum  wheat  and  dried raisins)  but,  in  an  important 
political declaration,  accepted  the Commission's  guide-
lines for  guarantee thresholds,  and  emphasised  the  ad-
visability of  introducing  them  for products  in surplus 
or  on  which  expenditure is likely to increase rapidly  • 
. I ... 
9. (b)  Milk: 
The  milk  sector,  with its grave  imbalance  between  supply 
and  demand,  had  to be  at the  centre of  any plan for  reform 
of  the  CAP.  In  1983,  the price increase for milk  had  al-
ready been  abated as  a  result of  the  guarantee  threshold 
being  exceeded.  But despite this,  milk  production  increased 
by  4%  in 1983,  and  the  Commission  was  obliged  to present the 
Council with  a  stark choice  :  either a  drastic cut of  the 
order of  12%  in milk prices,  or the  introduction of quotas 
to limit production  and maintain prices at a  more  reasonable 
level.  Ministers  chose  the latter and  fixed strict pro-
duction quotas  for  5  years.  Harsh  levies have  been  intro-
duced  for  any milk producer  who  exceeds  his  assigned  limit. 
The  levy has  been  set at 75%  and,  in  some  cases,  100%  of 
the milk  target price.  In other words,  totally dissuasive. 
In addition,  prices have  been  frozen. 
(c)  Prices: 
Price decisions were  adapted  to the different market situa-
tions for  the different products.  For  example,  for  sugar 
the price was  frozen  and  for grains  a  1%  cut was  applied. 
Overall,  farm prices  for  the  1984/85 marketing year were 
cut by  ~  % as  expressed in the European  Currency Units, 
compared with  a  forecast general inflation rate of  5~  %. 
And,  for  the first time  ever,  the Council's decisions 
meant  that in national currencies there were  significant 
price reductions  for  a  number  of  products  in several 
Member  States.  In addition,  there will be  an  intensifi-
cation of  our efforts to narrow the  gap  between  our  prices 
10. 
and  those  of our competitors.  This will apply particularly to grain  • 
.  / ... Since in politics one  has  to tackle one  thing at a  time, 
the  Commission  has  made  no  secret of its plans  to pro-
pose  for  the  1985/86 marketing year meaningful  cuts in 
grain prices following  this year's  1%  cut.  The  dairy 
farmers  caught it this year;  our  cereal growers  know 
it is their turn next. 
(d)  fo~~n!t~ ~r~f~r~n£e~ 
This brings me  to  an  external aspect of  the package 
which,  whilst only  a  very  small part of  the  whole,  seems 
to  have  attracted  a  great deal  of attention in the United 
States.  Since our  own  farmers  are  being  asked  to make 
considerable sacrifices and  to  limit their production, 
11. 
the  Commission  feels  that it is not unreasonable  to review 
the  treatment of  competing  imports  provided that this is 
done  strictly in accordance with international trading rules. 
As  I  said earlier,  we  are  aiming  to  narrow the gap 
between  our grain prices and  those of  our competitors.  Such 
a  move  will obviously  have  the effect of making  much  less 
attractive all those  grain  substitutes which at present 
displace our  own  feed  grains  and  have  also contributed to 
surpluses  in the dairy  and  livestock sectors.  But until 
that time  and whilst we  are  implementing  a  strict guarantee 
threshold and  requiring our grain producers  to  limit their 
own  production,  it is absolutely essential to have  some 
effective stabilisation of  the  imports of grain substitutes, 
such  as  corn gluten feed.  Corn  gluten feed is a  by-
product of  corn  sweetener manufacture,  the  booming 
. I ... production of which in the u.s.  is due  in no  small part -
dare  one mention this here  in Hawaii  - to the protective 
import quotas  and  high priced internal arrangements  en-
joyed  by  US  sugar  growers  and  of ethanol production en-
couraged  by  tax exemptions. 
Imports  of  corn gluten  feed  into the  EC  have,  in fact, 
soared  from  700,000  tons  to  3.5 million tons  since  1974. 
Our  intention,  therefore,  for  corn gluten  feed  is not  to 
12. 
ban  imports or reduce  them,  but to stabilise these  imports 
after discussion with the EC's major  suppliers against 
appropriate  compensation  on  our part for  any  loss of  growth  -
and  in full accordance with the  GATT  rules. 
In other words,  we  are  looking for  a  temporary breathing 
space  so  as  to avoid  the risk of  sabotage  to our efforts 
to get our grain prices  lower  and  to limit production. 
Such  stabilisation should also help  to reduce  surpluses 
in the dairy and  livestock sectors. 
However,  and  I  must  stress this,  what  is being pro-
posed is not hasty unilateral action,  not  a  banning  of all 
corn gluten  imports  nor  even  a  reduction,  as  one might 
gather  from  the  howls  of protest,  but what  we  hope will 
be  a  calm and  reasoned negotiation aimed at temporary 
stabilisation with appropriate  compensation  and  this only 
after fully carrying out  the procedures laid down  in the 
GATT.  Two  meetings  on  this subject have  already taken 
place in Geneva. 
. I ... Those  briefly were  the  tough decisions  taken  in 
Brussels at the  end of March  1984,  but this was  not an 
instant rescue  package  and  more  hard decisions will have 
to be  taken. 
Nevertheless,  the  long-term prospects for  control 
of agricultural policy and its expenditure  have  been  im-
proved.  The  Council  has  accepted three points of major 
importance 
First,  the principle that agricultural guarantees  can 
no  longer be  unlimited in nature.  Second,  an effective 
control of milk  production by  means  of quotas.  Third, 
a  tough price policy,  including  - for  the first time  -
price cuts  for  several products  in  several countries. 
Meanwhile,  a  budgetary  framework  is being evolved  by  the 
Community,  in which  financial discipline for all policies, 
including agriculture,  will be  exercised. 
But more  tough initiatives  will  be  required in the 
coming  years  to continue  the  rationalisation of 
agricultural policy on  which  the Community  is now  embarked. 
It would  be  an  illusion to suppose  that our task is com-
pleted.  Nevertheless,  the  CAP  is on  the right path. 
France's Minister of Agriculture,  Michel  Rocard,  declared  : 
"The  CAP  will remain at the centre of the European 
construction, but the benefits which it gives to 
fanners will :perhaps no longer be so exclusive,  ••• 
. I ... 
13. • • • • • • • • • •  and  so unlimited,  as in the past.  ~mat 
is needed now,  if the European adventure is to con-
tinue, is for the construction of agricultural 
Europe  to be accanpanied by comnon  policies in the 
fields of industry, ITOney,  research and even defence." 
It is this recognition that agriculture  - despite its dif-
ficulties,  and its differences  from  other sectors  - must 
be  more  and  more  integrated into Europe's  economy,  and 
must  find its place alongside other policies of  the  Commu-
nity,  that is perhaps  the most  important aspect of the 
decisions  recently taken on  the  CAP. 
In conclusion,  I  must  stress that these decisions, 
which are not an  attempt to shuffle off our  own  problems 
14. 
on  to others but which represent  an  important contribution 
towards  a  better balance of  supply  and  demand  on  world 
markets,  should  be  of benefit to  farmers  in all trading 
nations.  They  were  not,  I  must  emphasise,  taken purely for 
budgetary reasons,  but  to fit our  farming  to meet  the changed 
economic  circumstances of  the mid  1980's  and  beyond. 
They will not  lead to  the dismantling of  the  CAP  nor  to the 
disappearance of  European  farm  products  from  world markets. 
We  are not,  in the words  of  the poet Longfellow,  going  to 
"fold our  tents  and  silently steal away".  You  can instead 
expect  a  leaner,  more  streamlined European  agriculture.  We 
have  laid the  foundation  on  which  European  agriculture can 
expand its potential. 
. I ... 15. 
It seems  to me,  therefore,  that there is all the more 
reason for  each one  of  us  to  seek  cooperation rather than 
conflict,  particularly with the prospect of  ever  increasing 
yields around the world,  and  for  the major exporters to 
strive to find  some  way  of enabling the  hungry nations of 
the world  to purchase this bounty.  The  EC,  whilst defending 
its own  interests,  will be  prepared  - as it has  been  in the 
past - to  search diligently with other trading nations for 
ways  of  cooperating  in the  GATT  and  in other fora  such as 
the International Wheat  Council  so as to promote  world  trade. 
And  here, it would  be  helpful if the one-sided  campaign 
directed against the  Community  and its export  subsidies 
was  stopped  and  replaced  by  a  more  constructive approach 
looking at the overall support given to agriculture by all 
major  traders  - whether this be via  subsidies,  subsidised 
credit,  internal aids or  through  import restrictions. 
Since,  if we  don't seize the opportunity to cooperate 
openly  and  honestly,  we  shall all be  losers.  It is no 
good  individual nations  trying to re-write the rules on 
their own. 
Those  who  are not attracted to the  far  from  easy but pro-
mising path of cooperation  should bear in mind  the ghastly 
alternative of returning to  a  situation which  resembles 
that of the wastelands of  the 1930's. 
But,  for  such cooperation  and  for  any  other concerted 
measures,  we  shall need  considerable political will not 
only in Brussels and  Washington  but in capitals  around 
the world,  to achieve  rules of conduct for  agricultural 
trade which will benefit us all. 
./  ... I  believe that if we  keep  cool  and  bear in mind 
what  we  can all gain  and  what is at risk,  we  can  together 
build  a  more  secure  and  prosperous world  trading  system 
for  importer and  exporter alike. 
*  *  *  * 
22/10/84 
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